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ABSTRACT

Chakraborty, Ankur. M.S., Purdue University, May, 2010. Providing Availability
on the Poly^2 Framework. Major Professor: Eugene Spafford, Melissa Dark.
Availability is not often a primary concern for frameworks meant to provide
security. Poly^2 is one such framework. It provides us with a hardened foundation based
on secure design principles to run mission-critical services. While, the primary focus of
Poly^2 till now seems to have been fault isolation, we will now attempt to add recovery
as well. However, current techniques may compromise the security principles on which
the framework was originally built. We propose a hybrid system based on two popular
techniques to rectify the same.
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

The Poly^2 (short for poly-computer poly-network) paradigm (Bryant et
al., 2003) posited a hardened framework in which the critical network services of
an organization can operate. This framework was intended to provide robust
protection against the attacks running within this domain. As a part of this
approach, network services are separated. They are placed in applicationspecific systems and use minimized operating systems. This allows the isolation
of untrusted systems and services. This also prevents vulnerabilities in one
system from affecting other systems. The core design problems were inspired by
Saltzer and Schroeder principles (Saltzer & Schroeder, 1975) and Neuman’s
principles (Neumann, 2000).
While the paradigm looks at securing the system and from containing any
unwanted breaches, it however leaves the issue of availability open. The setup
inspired by the Poly^2 ensures security and isolation of services to prevent the
repercussions of breaches from spreading beyond the affected service.
Availability has been defined in Bryant et al. (2003) as systems that are
continuously operational for long periods of time.
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1.1. Definitions
The challenge with working on availability in this system is that the
security aspect of the paradigm will have to be kept at the forefront. This, of
course, would mean that a definition of availability has to be adopted that would
fit into this paradigm, which is why the above definition may seem inadequate.
The notion of availability has been borrowed from the telecommunications
industry and the definitions also seem to have followed those norms. These
norms have laid more stress on fault tolerance due to it’s inherent understanding
in the matter of telecommunications. By this, availability as defined by the
Alliance for Telecommunications Industry Solutions Telecom Glossary (2007) is
“The ratio of (a) the total time a functional unit is capable of being used during a
given interval to (b) the length of the interval”. In Ross (1997), availability is
given as the probability that a system is functioning at time t. In Laprie (1992),
availability is given as readiness for correct service.
However, all the above definitions relate to dependability only. Availability
is very closely related to security as security breaches have often led to
availability failures, examples of this being denial of service attacks, which often
lead to the service being unavailable. From a perspective of security, the
International Standards Organization (2000) defines availability as “Ensuring that
authorized users have access to information and associated assets when
required”. However, as is asserted in Rosseba et al. (2006), availability has to be
a consensus between dependability, security and usability. Therefore, the
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definition that is given in International Standards Organization (1989) and the
International Standards Organization (2001) seems the most suited.
Hence, the above definition that says, “Availability is the property of being
accessible and usable on demand by an authorized entity” will be adopted for the
purpose of this study. With this definition in mind, the research question will be
stated.

1.2. Research Question
How can services under the Poly^2 framework be made accessible and
usable on demand by an authorized entity through fault tolerance mechanisms?
What would be the costs involved in such a feature and how would they be
comparable to the alternatives?

1.3. Scope
There would be certain constraints that would be placed upon the
problem. The study would be attempting to provide fault tolerance within the
context of the framework. However, there may be an issue where a better
availability solution may have to be compromised to stay within the original
principles of the framework.
The scope of the problem is limited to fault recovery. As a result, the
researcher would be studied implementation of fault tolerance techniques in the
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context of providing secure services. However, Fault correction or prevention of
vulnerabilities are beyond the scope. When a service has been compromised,
the exact same service can be restored from a backup replica. This could
potentially mean a repeat of the event but this is beyond the scope of the current
endeavor.

1.4. Significance
The question of availability arises when the system is required to be
continuously operational for long periods of time. The Poly^2 framework is meant
to contain within itself the services that are mission critical to an organization
(Bryant et al., 2003). Due to this nature of framework, it is necessary that proper
measures be taken to ensure the protection and continuation of these services.
With the changing focus of security research, aspects other than security
are now also seen to be addressed (Meadows, 1994). Due to the prevalence of
denial-of-service attacks, it has become more important to address the issues of
availability in secure systems as well. Access control lists can be seen to address
the issues but unfortunately while they can prevent other processes from denying
the service access to resources, they cannot guarantee the actual provision of
the service.
It has been acknowledged in Kyamakya, et al. (2000) that totally secure
systems are not practical and that measures need to be taken to ensure that the
flow of services and information is uninterrupted. It has been mentioned that the
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system requirements need the essential and non-essential services to be
separated. The essential or mission critical services need to be made accessible
and usable by authorized entities.
The issue of integrating the paradigms of security and fault tolerance has
been explored as a part of the literature review. However, this issue is seen in
the real world as two separate ones. But ensuring that secured services remain
accessible and usable is necessary for the organization to function since
businesses are becoming more and more dependant on computers and
computer networks. These services although often protected may still remain
vulnerable to faults such as hardware failure, excessive load, etc. Added to this,
it also remains that all possible exploits cannot be accounted for within these
services. It has to be ensured that these services are available in the presence of
any possible faults (malicious or otherwise). While stopping them may involve
techniques that could be more expensive, the Poly^2 approach has been the
isolation and absorption of these faults, the colloquial “rolling with the punches”.
This is what makes the issue of providing this aspect of availability within Poly^2
significant.
However, there are a number of approaches to providing reliability aspects
to the Poly^2 framework. We will be using the cost-benefit analysis based
approaches to look at the technique proposed by the author vis-à-vis the existing
ones. This would give a more clear indication as to the benefits posed by the
technique.
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1.5. Limitations
The following were the limitations under which the research was carried
out:
•

While this study is to determine availability techniques for secure
network frameworks, the researcher will be focusing on the Poly^2
framework.

•

For the cost-benefit analysis, the researcher will be focusing on
replication-based techniques.

•

For the purpose of the implementation, the hardware of implementation
will be limited to the currently deployed hardware for Poly^2.

1.6. Delimitations
The following would be the delimitations under which the research would
be carried out:
•

For the purposes of the project, the replicas will also have the same
vulnerabilities as the original services.

•

The standing of the cost-benefit analysis is restricted to the service
providers.

•

The cost-benefit analysis will be limited in its extent on the cost to
the Poly^2 framework.
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•

The cost and the benefits would be applicable to the service
providers whose services would be falling under the purview of
Poly^2.

1.7. Chapter Conclusion
This chapter introduced the research the research being carried out for the
thesis. Also explored was the significance of the research as well as the
constraints within which it is being carried out.
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CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE SURVEY

There are primarily four components to a system providing availability –
fault detection, fault-tolerance, fault-recovery and fault prevention. The
researcher’s concerns are limited to fault-tolerance. This chapter will begin by
looking at existing literature in fault-detection since to be able to be tolerant to
faults, it is essential that they be detected first. It will then be looking at various
techniques for providing availability through replication and other techniques.
This section will be concluding with techniques that would harmonize both
availability and security.

2.1. Fault Detection
For failure detection, absence of proof of aliveness would be taken as
evidence of the same. Heartbeat messages provide perfect failure detection
(Anderson & Lee, 1982). They are exchanged between replicas during error-free
periods to keep a mutual track of redundant systems within the infrastructure.
Four accelerated heartbeat protocols were suggested to be used between
replicas (Gouda & McGuire, 1998). These protocols were based on the
principles of low beat rate, low detection delay and low probability of premature
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termination. Low beat rate is the rate at which the beat messages are sent, the
detection delay is the longest period that can be allowed to pass after one
process terminates and the probability of premature termination is the probability
that the heartbeat protocol declares termination due to the loss of a beat
message. These were with the purpose of reducing overhead and increasing the
responsiveness and reliability of the protocol, respectively. The first one is a
binary protocol involving only two processes, the next one is a static one with n
processes, and the third and the fourth protocols start with one process and
gradually expand to include more. The first three are static in the matter that they
do not allow members to leave (the first two do not allow members to enter
either). The fourth one allows members to leave the heartbeat network as well.
Later, a multi-level heartbeat protocol architecture is provided that is primarily to
prevent single points of failure (Li et al., 2009). Heartbeat protocols are primarily
deployed as processes on the application layer. This brings up the restrictions of
the scheduler on the protocol that might result in the protocol being inadvertently
compromised. It was proposed to integrate the protocol with the network layer
(Wang & Li, 2008). This technique let the protocol run directly from the kernel.
However, it required that a separate network interface be used that would require
major changes in infrastructure.
Often, perfect failures (which are detected by the heartbeat protocol) may
need to be need to be achieved in cases such as network breaches where failure
is not evident but may need to be declared to prevent further damage and to let
recovery take place. For this purpose, watchdog timers or a STONITH like
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approach, which uses a network power switch to reboot the service, may be
used. STONITH means “Shoot The Other Node In The Head”.

2.2. Replication
Due to the presence of single services running on each of the nodes on
the application nodes, a replication approach may be seen as a way towards
achieving availability. The semi-active replication (also known as leader/follower)
approach (Schmidt & O’Ryan, 2000) is one in which each non-deterministic
action is carried out in the replicas and then the leader notifies them that it has
been successfully carried out to keep the states consistent. This approach seems
to have limited applications. It requires that the files remain read-only. Due to
large volumes of data transfer, this approach may seem unsuitable for services
requiring high throughput. In the work by Deplance et al. (1999), a semi-active
replication strategy is implemented on the Chorus/ClassiX distributed operating
system. The main features of this system were that the management of the
replicas was transparent to the application designer and the application designer
had only to describe the distribution and replication of actors.
Active replication on the other hand has all nodes concurrently process
the incoming traffic (Wang et al., 2001) with the clients seeing only one server
that is responding. There are two approaches to implementing this. The first one
is that all the nodes use reliable multicast protocols to deliver the traffic to them
such as those proposed in Deering (1989). This technique, however, requires
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that both the client and the server are reliable multi-cast aware i.e. they are able
to use Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) for atomic
broadcasts/multicasts. Another way as proposed in Ayari et al. (2008a) and
Ayari et al. (2008b) is to provide a proxy or gateway as an intermediary to deliver
the messages to all the replicas. This may lead to higher processing overheads
and possible changes in the hardware architecture. Moreover, it ends up adding
another single point of failure. If either the proxy or gateway were to fail, it would
lead a nullification of the replication scheme. Architectural modification may also
be needed to accommodate the additional intermediary. Also, another suggested
technique of active state replication reduces the dependence on a single point of
failure. This involves the replicas passively intercepting and processing the traffic
offered to the primary server. However, only the primary server responds to the
traffic. This approach requires that the replicas be equivalent to the primary
server in regard to hardware and software capabilities. This seems suited to the
Poly^2 architecture where the replicas of the individual service servers would be
ones which would have exactly the same hardware and configurations. However,
this approach might lead to a breach of security. Because the primary server’s
state is replicated on all the replicas, a breach would also be replicated leading
possibly to recovery not occurring and hence defeating the whole purpose of
replication. In Engelmann (2007), approaches of replication to High-Performance
Computing (HPC) are described. An attempt is made to provide a generic
programming interface to create replication environments for different services
rather than building them from ground up. They provide three distinct models for
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replication. An Active/Standby model is one in which there is one active service
and atleast one standby service that operates either in warm or hot standby
mode. An asymmetric active/active model is one in which there are two or more
active services, each of which operates independently and share no state,
however they do have their own standby services sharing states with the either of
the active services. A symmetric active/active model is one in which there are
two or more active services which have the same capabilities and share the
same global state.

2.3. Other Availability Techniques
A checkpointing approach (Laadan et al., 2005) can be seen as a passive
replication technique. The server state is periodically copied to a standby server
and restored from the checkpoints during failures. This approach works at the
transport layer in a protocol independent manner. This approach decouples the
operating system from distributed application. The application itself is run on a
virtualization layer. This allows the checkpointing application to simultaneously
and smoothly checkpoint the distributed application. The main problems seem to
be lack of perennial consistency between the primary servers and the replicas
and the significant overheads that may be incurred when creating the checkpoint.
From a security perspective, however, this approach may allow a fallback to a
point where the system was not compromised.
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In Bhide (1992), availability schemes are discussed with two very distinct
scenarios. One is with a Shared Nothing Database with Asynchronous Replica
Management and the other is with a Network File System. In these schemes,
Bhide discusses a basic asynchronous replication technique on which both the
replication methods are based. All the transactions are carried out on the primary
entity and the transactions are located on a log that is often kept in a separate
domain to protect it from failure. The log is used to run the transactions on
replicas. This update can be done either upon failure or be carried out regularly.
This is seen to require large amounts of network bandwidth but is efficient in
terms CPU and I/O required. With the NFS, there are two layers of replication
that are carried out. One is at disk level and the other is at server-level. Each
server services two similar disks on which the data is replicated so in case of disk
failure on one of the disks, the other disk can maintain the data. With the servers,
in case of failure, the replica server can obtain the current “duplication cache”
from one of the disks and carry on the service keeping the failure and recovery
transparent to the users. However, in this case the protocol itself is stateless and
the effects of this technique with stateful protocols are yet to be seen. In case of
the asynchronous replica management, the transaction state is used to maintain
the replicas. All changes are recorded onto a log and in the event of a failure, the
replica fetches this log and updates it’s state to the primary server’s point of
failure.
All these techniques, however, give security a secondary consideration.
They do form the basis and are also the most commonly used techniques used
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to provide availability. We will now look at some of the existing work at
harmonizing fault tolerance and security.

2.4. Security and Fault Tolerance

In Meadows (1995), it is argued that the current security paradigm is a
subset of the types of approaches used in dependability. This is to move away
from the currently used approach of a worst case scenario. Instead in Meadows
(1994), it is suggested moving towards a failure model. Among the approaches
missed, is the particular one of fault tolerance. Though Meadows argues that
fault tolerance principles have been subconsciously used in security paradigms
such as operating systems that have multilevel security to keep possibly
malicious code in the untrusted portion of the system. Taking this view, Meadows
builds a fault model for security based on the three areas of faults in security
mechanisms, hostile attacks on the system and compromises due to poor usage
of the security mechanisms. However, we shall be taking an approach which
goes in the opposite direction in which Meadows has been pointing. Instead of
fashioning the security paradigm around the dependability paradigm, we will be
attempting to fashion fault tolerance around the security paradigm.
In Price (2001), the author attempts to provide fault tolerance to security
protocols. For this purpose, he redefines failure in case of protocols to say that it
occurs when the goals of the protocol specification are not met. He gave a fault
tolerance mechanism based on anonymity to provide security against denial of
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service attacks. Next, he attempted to show the effect of state on fault tolerance
in secure services. He gave, on the basis of statelessness, two notions of
replication for secure services. A stateless server involves complete
independence between the replicas to prevent a malicious server from exposing
the rest of the replication group. However, this form of disconnection is not
feasible for providing availability. A semi-stateless server, on the other hand
shares a limited set of information with other servers within the group. This allows
a form of limited replication that can be controlled through the security policy.
This also prevents the malicious server from exposing the group completely. This
technique is one that can be easily integrated into a hardened framework where
security policy on the rest of the network is determined. However, unlike stateful
replication, this may lead to loss of functionality and may defeat the very purpose
of replication if the security policy is not configured properly.
In Malkhi and Reiter (1998), a secure replication technique is suggested
based on a quorum. In this case, there are a large number of servers and the
operations are carried out on a quorum of the same. i.e. if there are a total of n
servers, the operations are based on the responses from a quorum which is
typically !n. This allows the systems to tolerate a wide range of failures. This was
primarily meant to service applications such as Public Key infrastructures,
Publishing and dissemination and National Voting Systems.
In Cachin and Poritz (2002), a replication technique that maybe tolerant to
intrusions is suggested. It involves using a cryptographic channel for the purpose
of atomic broadcasts in order to securely maintain the causality of the system. It
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is built upon multiple layers of cryptographic primitives and binary agreements
upon which the replication is carried out. The atomic broadcast itself is
considered a channel for the purposes of this system through which a secure
fault tolerance system is built.
In Schneider and Zhou (2005), a form of distributed trust is posited. This
involves basing the fault tolerance on the distributed trust. This way, if a single or
a small number of components are disabled or compromised, the ensemble of
state machines would still outvote their actions. The approach suggested here
however does tend to go against traditional replication paradigms. There
suggestions are to use multiple server configurations that may not necessarily
have common software. While, this approach will prevent vulnerabilities from
being replicated. It will also create issues with coordination of replicas.
In Reiter (1995), a toolkit is provided to attempt to provide a replication
solution to security-critical services. Called Rampart, it attempts to provide
correct and reliable replication service inspite of malicious intent of attackers
attempting to enter the system. This toolkit takes the approach of relieving the
developer of issues regarding replication and takes care of the aspect. The
primary components of the toolkit are the secure atomic multicast, reliable
multicast and the group membership protocol. Cryptographic attributes were
used to insure that the protocols functioned in asynchronous environments.
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2.5. Looking at Cost Benefit Analysis Techniques
Cost benefit analysis is used to allocate resources more efficiently to
certain projects. Cost benefit analysis are performed either during the course of
the project, known as media res; while the project is being considered, known as
ex ante; or at the end of the project, also known as ex post (Boardman et al,
2006). Cost Benefit analysis is often used to show the superiority of a project
with respect to alternatives.
In Boardman et al, (2006), a fundamental approach to cost benefit
analysis is examined. It starts with the very basic process of identifying the set of
alternative projects that may be used instead of the one under consideration.
Next, the actor who plays the principal role in the project is identified. This actor
is said to have standing, i.e. it is their costs and benefits that are being studied.
Next the impact of the project alternatives is studied as benefits or costs. Along
with this, the measurement criterion is also specified. Next the impact of the
project is specified over its lifetime. This impact is monetized and the net value of
the project is discovered.
The above method deals on a generic level of cost-benefit analysis with
non-information technology projects as well. However, in cost-benefit analysis of
IT products, it is often difficult to evaluate the benefits (Sassone, 1998). There
are some methodologies that are discussed to carry out cost benefit analysis on
Information Technology products. Decision Analysis provides an operations
research perspective to making choices. It is particularly useful for evaluating
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systems meant to support routine decision making. A structural model represents
a line of business or function and the impact of the information system on the
costs and benefits of the function. A breakeven analysis is carried out by
parametrizing the benefits obtained. This is often carried out when the benefits
cannot be quantified. Subjective analysis is carried out again when the benefits
are intangible, speculative or uncertain. It is often carried out in response to a
fixed cost.
However, for information security projects a different approach to cost
benefit analysis is required. The benefits are often tied directly to the costs
making cutting costs an important benefit (Gordon and Loeb, 2005).The
magnitude of cybersecurity breaches often defines the cost and whether it is
direct or indirect cost or whether it is implicit or explicit. The goal with
implementing any project has to be the maximization of benefits with respect to
the costs.
The benefits with respect to cybersecurity are often cost avoidance; i.e.
avoiding the costs that occur due to cybersecurity breaches. There are a number
of models that can be associated with the treatment of cost avoidance as
possible benefits in cybersecurity. Often, it is required that the anticipated
benefits be compared to costs over time. A model that is associated with such an
approach is the net present value (NPV) model. NPV refers to the difference
between the present cost of the project and its initial cost. This approach is useful
in considering incremental investment to cybersecurity. A positive NPV leads to
an acceptance of the measures, while a negative or zero NPV leads to rejection
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or indifference. The NPV shows how much the anticipated benefits would
exceed the present value of the anticipated costs. The internal rate of return
(IRR) model is a derivative of the NPV model. Instead of dealing with present
value, it uses the average cost of capital as a metric. The cost of capital is the
minimum rate a project needs to earn in order to keep the organization’s value
from reducing. The IRR is the discount that makes the NPV equal to zero. An
IRR greater than the average cost of capital leads to an acceptance of the
measures, while lesser or equal IRR would lead to rejection or indifference.
The above, however, have dealt with how to carry out a cost-benefit
analysis. Wei et al (2001) carry out the cost-benefit analysis of installing a
Network Intrusion Detection System (NIDS). They use the Annual Loss
Expectancy (ALE) as their metric to determine the cost involved. ALE here refers
to the product of the number of incidents with the total number of incidents that
have occurred. They use a cost model based on operating costs, damage costs
and response costs where operating costs are the costs involved in analyzing the
stream of traffic, the response costs involve the costs of responding to the
intrusion while the damage costs involve the costs that might be incurred if the
intrusion is successful. The cost benefit is carried out based on the cost incurred
due to the ALE, the costs of the countermeasure and the savings incurred due to
the same.
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2.6. Chapter Conclusion
This chapter explored the various fault detection techniques, replication
methods and other availability models in the course of this chapter. It then looked
at the various attempts that have been made at marrying the concepts of security
and fault tolerance. To get an indication of the benefits accrued due to the
project, a cost benefit analysis is carried out. This chapter looked at some
approaches that have been explored in the cybersecurity domain. Keeping these
in mind, the approach towards implementing availability within the Poly^2
framework will now be looked at.
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CHAPTER 3. METHODOLOGY

3.1. Implementation

There would be two aspects of looking at the problem. One would be an
analysis of the costs associated with implementation of the aspect. The second
would be the implementation itself.
The research focuses on carrying out a study of high availability
techniques. For the analysis, a cost-benefit analysis of the techniques we have
suggested with respect to the Poly^2 system was carried out. This analysis took
into account changes to software, hardware, configuration as well as
architectural changes. Potential benefits will be including fault tolerant
characteristics in the Poly^2 framework. The Poly^2 framework is based on
secure design principles. As a part of the analysis, it has to be taken into account
as well as how much would these design principles be affected. Upon the
completion of the analysis, the most viable of the techniques will be
implemented.
The nodes of the Poly^2 framework are single service servers. Each of
them has customized operating systems and minimized network stacks. The
operating system is tuned to support a single, specific application. This tuning is
carried out primarily in terms of performance and security. This specialization
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allows detection of deviations from normal behavior. With respect to the analysis,
it has to be seen as to how these techniques will affect this configuration and to
what extent.
The researcher has two possible approaches to the problem posited. He
can either adopt an active replication technique, a checkpointing approach or a
hybrid of both. An active replication technique would seem suited to the purpose
due the lack of service consolidation and the presence of a gateway within the
framework that would simplify the use of one-to-many multicast. However, with
active replication, malicious states might be replicated as well. Vulnerabilities and
breaches that had been found in the primary node would be replicated in the
replica as well which would not serve our purpose.
The checkpointing approach combined with an Intrusion Detection System
(IDS) may solve the above condition. If on detecting an intrusion or attack
through the IDS and failure of the node, the last checkpoint before the intrusion
may be restored. However, this approach may slow down legitimate faults that
occur through other means.
To detect failure in the nodes, a heartbeat protocol may be used. A
heartbeat protocol is already in place between the Poly^2 gateways and a
protocol based on the work of (Li et al., 2009) may be implemented with the
gateways as the control nodes.
The researcher expects a hybrid active replication-checkpointing approach
as a way towards solving our research question. As a part of this, it is expected
to make this feature a part of the Poly^2 framework.
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3.2. Cost-Benefit Analysis
The cost-benefit analysis of the project was carried out based on the
benefits with respect to the alternatives available. We would be looking at active
replication and checkpointing as alternatives since they are the ones most
popular in usage today. Our costs would be based on the impact on the original
design of the Poly^2 framework, the engineering resources which would be
involved and the software engineering effort which would be involved. Our
benefits would be in terms of decrease in downtime and the effectiveness of the
recovery that can be initiated.
With respect to the monetary costs regarding the costs as well as benefits
with respect to the projects analyzed, costs are recorded on a per incident basis
leading to an average dollar value (Gordon et al, 2005). However, the Poly^2
framework is yet to be implemented commercially giving it a unique perspective.
Due to it’s current prototype status and lack of public deployment, obtaining
precise values for dollar costs would be beyond the scope, hence the analysis
would be restricted to non-monetary costs. The analysis restricts itself to the first
order effects of the costs as well as the benefits. That is, we consider the effects
only on the actors who would be affected through direct loss of business,
availability and reputation if the service became unavailable.
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CHAPTER 4. COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS

As we have mentioned before, for the purpose of our cost benefit analysis
we will be looking at cost benefit analysis of the project through two aspects.
First, we will be looking at the alternatives. These include two recovery
paradigms, one is based on the active state replication paradigm and the other is
based on a checkpointing paradigm. Second, we will be looking at the alternative
suggested as a part of this project and comparing it to the other two alternatives.
This analysis was carried out in the media res form. In this case, i.e. it was
carried out in the duration of the project.

4.1. Analysis of the Active State Replication Paradigm

The active state replication paradigm relies on a single primary server and
multiple replicas of the server. Under normal functioning, the state of the primary
service is replicated across the replicas. Whenever the primary server is
subjected to a fault, one of the replicas takes over in a process that is transparent
to the user. There are two basic ways this technique can be implemented. One, a
proxy or gateway handles communication between the users and service. The
proxy keeps track of the availability of the service and distributes the incoming
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communications to all the nodes but allows only the communication from the
active node to go out. When a fault occurs, it redirects traffic from the next active
node. The other type in which there is no proxy, all the nodes receive the traffic
and use it to update their states. However, it is only the active node that
responds. When it fails, the next node takes over. In case of a proxy, there has to
be a significant change to the Poly^2 architecture to accommodate another
gateway in front of the services. In case of no proxy, it becomes the responsibility
of the nodes internally to keep track of the active node. Also, to ensure that all
the nodes receive the incoming data, the multicast has to be reliable.
For both forms of the technique, the communication costs will be high
since the states are being kept perennially updated. Putting up either a proxy or
making the multicast reliable will require a high engineering cost. In case an
exploit occurs, it is replicated across the nodes and persists even if the initial
active node fails and the new one takes over.
This technique however, offers lower downtime. Since the next node is
already active and in the current state of the service, it can take over seamlessly.
Also, due to state persistence, when the active node fails, the data is preserved
by all the nodes in the replication cluster. The storage required is limited to any
write action carried out on the nodes.
Hence, the high costs are associated with communications, engineering
and exploitation persistence. Costs are mitigated in terms of loss of data,
storage, downtime and loss of data.
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4.2. Analysis of the Checkpointing Paradigm
The checkpointing paradigm ensures that service on restoration is always
restored from a point at which the service was uncompromised. A checkpoint is
maintained on which the image of the service is kept and if required updated.
When a fault occurs, the service is restored from the stored checkpoint. The
storage costs with regard to this are sufficiently high since a complete image will
have to be kept to initiate a recovery. Since the checkpoint is not necessarily a
reflection of the current state of the service, there may be a significant amount of
data loss when the recovery from checkpoint is initiated. There may be a
perceptible difference in time as the checkpointing showing a small but significant
downtime.
However, the communication costs would be low since the active node
would not need to communicate with any other node. The checkpoint can be
hosted as a virtual machine allowing restoration from an image. This decreases
the engineering effort required to carry it out. Since, a checkpoint need only be
carried out infrequently and then at the point of a fault, the processing overheads
involved are low. Since the current state is not maintained and the checkpoint is
restored from an uncompromised state, any exploitation on the service carried
out in the current state does not persist post-recovery.
Hence, the costs are associated in terms of storage, loss of data and
downtime. Costs are mitigated in terms of communication, engineering effort,
processing overheads and persistence of exploitations.
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4.3. Analysis of the Hybrid Recovery System
The hybrid system creates a two-tier recovery technique including aspects
of both the active state replication as well as the checkpointing recovery system.
It invokes the active state replication when there are faults that may not have
been triggered by a malicious entity. In this case, one of the replicas would take
over the function of the primary service, maintaining the state and ensuring that
the process is transparent to the user. However, in case of exploits caused by a
malicious entity the service would be restored from a previous clean state
ensuring that service being provided is uncompromised. In case of this
technique, the average downtime would be lower since a checkpoint recovery
would only be triggered in case of a malicious activity being triggered by a
detection system. Also unlike the active replication system, the state would only
be maintained in case of fault that has not been triggered by a malicious entity.
This would ensure that the exploitation of vulnerabilities which may have been
persistent over the replicas is not so.
However, the costs incurred in this case would be the engineering efforts
involved in setting up this technique as well as the cost of setting up an intrusion
detection system to determine which faults may have been triggered by a
malicious entity. Also involved would be the cost of implementing both the
checkpointing recovery technique as well as the active state replication technique
including the human effort involved. In spite of the costs involved, the critical
services that fall within the purview of the Poly^2 framework would benefit greatly
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from the hybrid technique. Availability of services often affects events such as
loss of business and reputation that is significant for the actors involved.

4.4. Conclusion
From the above analysis, we can observe that there are a number of
factors on which the costs can be obtained. These costs and their possible
mitigation can guide the reasoning for selecting a particular recovery technique.
This, however, does not take into account the costs or benefits with regard to the
adoption of the Poly^2 framework. This analysis was carried out with respect to
services that are being run under the Poly^2 framework.
With regard to costs of communications, it is seen to be high in case of
active replication and low in case of checkpointing. It is high in case of active
replication due to the communication required to maintain the state of the nodes.
The same cost applies to the hybrid recovery technique as well.
With regard to costs of storage, this cost is significantly high in case of the
checkpointing technique due to the requirement to store the image of the service.
This cost would apply to the hybrid recovery technique as well since the
checkpoint technique is implemented as a part of the hybrid recovery technique.
The active state replication has a high engineering cost as well as a
possibly high cost due to the impact on the framework. The hybrid recovery
technique also has the same cost associated. However, instead of using a proxy
that could potentially increase the impact on the framework itself, the proxy-less
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alternative is used. This cost is however; relatively low for the checkpointing
technique where the service is hosted upon a virtual machine and restored from
an uncompromised image upon the occurrence of a fault. The similar cost for the
hybrid recovery mechanism is high since it is required to have both the functions
of the checkpointing as well as the active replication technique.
The cost occurring due to loss of data is high with the checkpointing
technique. This is due to the fact that when it is initiated, the service is restored to
a previous state and all the data in the interim is lost. This is mitigated with
respect to the hybrid recovery technique. In this case, the checkpointing is
initiated only when a malicious fault is thought to have occurred.
The cost associated with downtime is significantly higher in checkpointing.
This is mitigated in the hybrid recovery technique. This is again due to the fact
that the checkpointing is initiated only in the specific circumstance of a malicious
fault. Otherwise, the technique uses active replication to recover from a fault that
has a lower cost associated with downtime.
The cost associated with processing overheads is high with the active
replication technique since it requires that the state be constantly upgraded
across all nodes. This cost is reflected in the hybrid recovery as well.
The persistence of exploitation is present in the active replication
technique. However, it is significantly mitigated with the hybrid recovery
technique. In case of malicious faults, the technique uses the checkpointing from
a previously uncompromised state where the exploitations are no longer allowed
to persist.
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Table 4.1 Table of Costs
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Low
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High

High

Medium

Medium

High
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With respect to the benefits, it is seen that the active replication technique
has a lower time to recovery in comparison to the checkpointing technique.
However for the hybrid recovery technique, it is seen that while time to recovery
is low when it is functioning in the active replication form, it may increase when a
malicious fault occurs and the checkpointing form is employed.
In case of the state preservation and continuity of the service, the hybrid
recovery technique maintains the state in case of normal functioning, i.e. when
no faults occur and when there are non-malicious faults. In case of the
checkpointing technique, the current state is not preserved and on recovery,
current connections and data may be lost.
In case of removal of exploits, when a malicious fault occurs, the hybrid
recovery technique initiates the checkpointing that restores the service from an
uncompromised image. However, an active replication technique replicates the
exploit over all the nodes and when the current active node fails, the node to take
over has the same exploit.
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Both the checkpointing and active replication respond to all incidents in
the same manner. However, the hybrid recovery mechanism differentiates the
response based on the input from the intrusion detection system. If a nonmalicious fault occurs, the active replication form is triggered. If a malicious fault
is detected, the checkpointing technique is initiated. This ensures that while the
state is preserved and normal functioning can be carried out in cases of nonmalicious faults but in case of malicious ones, the exploits are not allowed to
remain persistent and all connections including potentially malicious ones are
abandoned.

Table 4.2 Table of Benefits
Benefit

Time to
Recovery

Preserv
ation of
State

Low
High
Medium

Technique
Active
Replication
Checkpointing
Hybrid
Recovery

Response
to incident

High

Removal
of
potential
exploits
Low

Low
High

High
High

Low
High

Low

We see that the hybrid recovery technique shares the costs with regard to
both the active replication as well as the checkpointing technique. However, it
also mitigates the costs with respect to both leading to reduced loss of data and
downtime (in comparison to checkpointing) and reduced persistence of exploits
(in comparison to active replication). It also is able to provide a differentiated
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response in case of both malicious and non-malicious faults and thus, providing
an alternative to both active replication and checkpointing.
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CHAPTER 5. THE ARCHITECTURE

To implement the technique, a two-tier architecture was implemented. To
recover from non-malicious faults, it is considered valuable if the state is
maintained. This means that the recovery would need to be such that loss in
capacity is transparent to the service user. However for malicious faults, such a
capacity may not be wholly in favour of the service. A state of being actively
replicated may not be advisable in the case of a malicious fault. In such a case, it
might be required that the connections be abandoned and restored to a
previously uncompromised state. Hence, it would be important that the
potentially malicious connection is abandoned and the service restored. This is
carried out by restoring the service from a backup in the form of an image. There
is, however, another issue of detecting when a malicious fault occurs. For this
purpose, we use an intrusion detection system (IDS) to generate the alerts
whenever a potentially malicious activity occurs.
To maintain the state in case of non-malicious faults, replicas of the
service are kept whose states are kept consistent with that of the primary service.
In the event of the failure of the primary service, one of the replicas may be able
to take over in a process that is transparent to the user. Due to the maintenance
of the state, current connections are not lost and neither is the data.
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Next, the three main components of the architecture would be explored.
The checkpointing system that provides recovery from malicious would be first
explored. Then, the active state replication would be looked at. After that, the
detection system that bridges these two recovery systems would be looked at.

5.1. Checkpoint Recovery
The recovery system suggested is similar to the one proposed by Laadan
et al (2005). However, this system has significant changes to accommodate the
requirements of the project including the limitations and the scope already stated.
To carry out the checkpointing, another layer introduced between the host
operating system and the service. The service itself is hosted on a virtual
machine that is in turn hosted on the server. The servers used are of two kinds –
Sun SunFire V60X and Dell PowerEdge 1850.
The SunFire V60X has the host operating system as FreeBSD 8.0 running
under the following hardware specifications:
•

"#$%&''$#!()*+!,-.&/!0&$-!(123!456*!

•

789+!):1;!9<!

•
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The Dell PowerEdge 1850 has the host operating system as FreeBSD 8.0
running under the following hardware specifications:
•

"#$%&''$#!()*+!,-.&/!0&$-!(123!456*!
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The service itself is run on virtual machines on a Sun VirtualBox platform
administered across the network by the Poly^2 security server. The running of
the checkpointing technique is shown below.

Figure 5.1 Checkpointing form

When the service is initialized, a image of it is created and kept. Assuming
that initially image was not compromised, this image is kept as an
uncompromised state. When the compromise of a service is detected, the current
state of the service is abandoned and the service is restored from the
uncompromised image. However, as a result of this all current connections are
abandoned and any data that was in the current state is also. In case of the chat
server implementation, this refers primarily to the chat history and the
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connections to the clients. When the service is compromised and a recovery is
carried out from a checkpoint, the connections as well as the chat history are
lost.

5.2. Active Replication

The replication for maintaining the state of the application is carried out at
an application level. For the purpose of the project, the application to be used for
the purpose is chat server that has been replicated across two servers. This
would be similar to the approach taken by Wang et al (2001). The application
itself built upon the foundation provided by the JGroups API. JGroups is a toolkit
for providing reliable multicast communication. This property is used to provide
maintenance of state between the primary service and it’s replicas. Interactions
take place between the client and the cluster hosting the services. The cluster is
transparent to the user. Upon failure of the primary server, a replica takes over
it’s functions in a manner that the previous sessions are carried over. Such a
function while desirable in the case of a non-malicious failure, however, in case
of the involvement of a malicious entity, the recovery would revert to the
checkpoint system enumerated formerly. The active replication form is shown
below.
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Figure 5.2 Active Replication form

The user interacts with the service in a manner that the active replication
form is transparent to it. Whenever there is a communication from the user to the
active node, all the nodes intercept it but the active node only sends the
response. This ensures that the state (in this case, the chat history) is current
across all the nodes. Whenever the current active node fails, the operation can
be taken over by the next node.
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5.3. Detection

There has to be a differentiation as to when of the above two techniques
has to be used. While the active replication technique maintains the state of the
service but the technique requires a higher overhead and also leads to
persistence of any exploits that take place. The checkpoint technique ensures
that the system is restored from a clean state, however, with significant loss of
data and higher recovery time.
To differentiate which of the two techniques should be employed
according to the event, an intrusion detection system was employed. On
detection of an event by the system, the checkpoint recovery is triggered.
In case of this project, an intrusion detection system based on SNORT
was employed. It was hosted upon a hardened system having a FreeBSD 8.0
operating system. The hardware it was hosted upon was a Sun SunFire V60x.
The intrusion detection system was placed in front of the primary gateway
to and was made transparent to the services as well users accessing the
services.

5.4. Chapter Conclusion
The architecture that has been enumerated is overlayed upon the Poly^2
framework. It does not affect the original design of the Poly^2 framework but
extends it. All services are still isolated from each other not only in their own
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individual servers but in their individual clusters. Attacks taking place on a
specific service are not only isolated to the particular service but the service itself
is not completely lost as well with recovery mechanisms being in place. The
complete framework is seen below.

Figure 5.3 Poly^2 with Availability

The application clusters shown have the recovery mechanisms for the
particular service. Each of the services is contained within a single cluster
instead of a single server. The nodes in each cluster provide for the active
replication while each node has the capacity to carry out a checkpoint recovery
on direction from the security server. The security server also monitors the
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intrusion detection system and upon receiving a alert, it instructs the nodes of
attacked service to undergo checkpointing.
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CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK

The recovery mechanisms that have been explored in this project add a
novel extension to the Poly^2 framework. The original framework isolated each of
the services into their own ‘cages’. A cage was their particular hardware and
operating system allowing for their isolation to the outside attacks. The recovery
mechanisms acted as an extension to this concept. Each of the service cages is
extended to be a cluster to provide recovery to the service.
The recovery mechanism suggested in this work is novel in the sense that
it takes the advantages of two well-known mechanisms and applies them in a
manner that mitigates their disadvantages. The active state replication ensures
that in case of non-malicious faults, the user experiences only a minimal amount
of disturbance. However, the checkpointing recovery system ensures that in case
of malicious faults, the system recovers from it albeit with an increased amount of
downtime and loss of data.
This system is meant to be used under two conditions. The service has to
be placed under the Poly^2 framework. The service also has to be such that it is
expected to be attacked occasionally and not with a very high frequency. This
was shown by the cost-benefit analysis where it was seen that a high occurrence
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of the checkpointing form, which is employed in case of malicious faults, will lead
to a higher cost in terms of downtime and loss of data.
However, there are some issues that can be addressed. Currently, the
recovery in the checkpoint mechanism takes place from a former, static version
of the service. Whenever, the service is restored from an uncompromised image,
it is still vulnerable to the same vulnerability that previously exploited the service.
This can be improved by having a mechanism that on regular intervals updates
the service image so that on recovery at some point, the service restored is a
fixed version of the image.
The intrusion detection system is a rule-based system that detects
breaches based upon the ruleset upon which the system functions. However, if
the breach is not detected by the intrusion detection system, it may lead to a fault
that the system may believe to be non-malicious which will eventually lead to an
incorrect part of the mechanism being initiated. A detection system that is more
robust may improve the functioning of the overall system.
The active replication part of the system is currently taking place at an
application level. Improving this in a manner such that this takes place at a level
independent of the application allowing this system to be generic for any
application that would need to be placed within the framework.
The recovery system though hybrid in nature can be improved by
changing the very essence of it. The current system requires that the functions
be differentiated on the basis of input received from the detection system. A
unified recovery paradigm that can provide comprehensive recovery within the
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paradigm of the Poly^2 framework would be an interesting improvement to the
project.
The Poly^2 framework is meant to protect an organization’s missioncritical services. However, setting up such a framework for an organization can
be an expensive undertaking. It would be an interesting exploration to look at an
approach where the framework is offered as a service where mission-critical
services can be placed in their individual Poly^2 ‘cages’.
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